![]() administrations, whether Republican or Democrat, are likely to favor a stronger alliance framework. The second assumption is that the United States could experience a change in political leadership. allies to band together to advance shared views and push back on regimes attempting to revise the international order. As global competition increases, there are structural and institutional incentives for democratic U.S. Several rising poles in the new global order are authoritarian, with skeptical views of democracy, free press, and open markets. ![]() First, multipolarity increases incentives to cleave to parties with shared interests. Regarding the United States, its alliance system may remain robust by 2025-2030 based on two assumptions. But at the macro level, these poles may align around regime type, with the democratic United States and Europe aligned against Russia and China. Senior Adviser, International Security Programīy 2025-2030, there will be multipolarity between different parties, with the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union representing different poles. Neither country has distinguished itself or aided the international community significantly in responding. Moreover, the United States and China will likely emerge from the Covid-19 pandemic having taken significant damage to their prestige and soft power. This is why alliances and economic partnerships are so important in a world of increasing multipolarity. France, Germany, India, and Japan are powers in their own right, for example. Military and economic rivalry among the United States, China, and Russia is important to geopolitics, but so is the degree to which other “great powers,” some with nuclear weapons, seek alternative paths, potentially together. debates over “great power competition” obscure the true state of international affairs that is evolving. alliances hold in this world, though allies more selectively choose where to align with the United States versus choosing their own paths.Ĭurrent U.S. In the new geopolitical environment, it is increasingly difficult for any single country to exercise its will, and multiple poles compete and cooperate.The “Great Power Competition” paradigm in the most recent National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy inaccurately describes this new geopolitical environment. ![]() and likely others’ defense budgets, which could affect the pace of force modernization. The economic effects of Covid-19 will increase downward pressure on U.S.Neither China nor the United States is positioned to emerge from Covid-19 as a “winner” in a way that would dramatically shift the balance of world power in its favor.Covid-19 has accelerated the transition to a more fragmented world order in which the future organizing principles of the international system are unclear.But what about the long-term impact?ĬSIS Risk and Foresight Group Director Sam Brannen asked four of his International Security Program colleagues to take the long view on how Covid-19 could affect geopolitics out to 2025-2030 and beyond. Escalating tensions between the United States and China are the clearest immediate-term outcome. The Covid-19 pandemic is reshaping geopolitics. ![]()
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